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I. INTRODUCTION
Although HIV/AIDS has claimed centre stage in public and political debates
over the last few years, South African scholars largely refrain from examining
and discussing the right to privacy and its limitations in the context of
HIV/AIDS. Until the Constitutional Court’s decision in NM and Others v
Smith and Others,1 the lack of literature was accompanied by a scarcity of case
law regarding the importance of the protection of privacy of HIV-infected
people. This article aims to set the scene for a debate on HIV/AIDS and
privacy: the scope of the right, its importance for HIV-infected individuals
and the justiﬁability of limitations in the form of public health interventions.
As an introduction to the subject matter, the ﬁrst part of this article
provides a brief overview of academic discussion around the right to privacy.
The article examines the scope of the right and its distinction from other
human rights, before assessing its importance for people living with
HIV/AIDS. Although both the common law and constitutional law protect
privacy, concerns are raised as to whether the legal mechanisms are sufﬁcient
to truly protect HIV-infected individuals.
The second part of the article focuses on public health interventions that
limit the right to privacy, and thoroughly analyses their implications. First,
current health guidelines on HIV disclosure by health care professionals are
reviewed, and, drawing on comparative health policies, it is debated whether
partner notiﬁcation programmes should be introduced in South Africa.
Interesting questions around the justiﬁability of invasions of privacy and
health care professionals’ legal duty to warn patients’ partners are discussed.
* Dr of Law (Julius Maximilians University Wuerzburg, Germany). Sincere
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1 NM and Others v Smith and Others 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). The decision is
hereafter referred to as NM and Others v Smith.
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The article then looks at HIV disclosures envisaged by recent legislative
developments. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
AmendmentAct2 makes provision for the compulsory HIV testing of alleged
sexual and other offenders. The article undertakes a thorough examination of
these statutory provisions and raises serious questions in relation to their
justiﬁability.
II. PART I: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The ﬁrst part of this article serves as an introduction to — rather than a
comprehensive discussion of — the right to privacy. Despite its protection
under the legal framework, research as well as case law provides us with
practical examples of infringements of privacy of HIV-infected individuals. It
will be shown that violations of privacy often imply adverse effects on other
rights like dignity and equality.
1. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy is preserved by both the common law and constitutional
law (s 14 Constitution).3 As academic literature demonstrates considerable
controversy over the scope, deﬁnition and distinction of privacy from other
human rights, the article brieﬂy reﬂects on the concept of privacy.
(a) Common law v constitutional law
(1) Common law
The common law recognises the right to privacy as an independent
personality right that is part of the concept of ‘dignitas’.4 According to the
common law, the breach of a person’s privacy constitutes an iniuria. For this
iniuria to occur, the following elements must be proved: (1) an invasion of
privacy; (2) wrongfulness; and (3) fault.5 An invasion of privacy can occur by
intrusion into or publication of private facts.6 The second element,
wrongfulness or unlawfulness, is judged by the contemporary boni mores of
2 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007.
3 These two branches of law serve different purposes. The objective of the com-
mon law is to regulate relationships between private parties. Hence, the purpose of a
delictual remedy based on the common law is to offer compensation for a suffered
harm. Constitutional law, on the other hand, aims primarily at protecting human
rights from intrusion of the state; see Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA
786 (CC) at para 17.
4 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 68 citing O’Keeffe v Argus
Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 247F–249D and Universiteit van
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA441 (A) 455H–456H.
5 David McQuoid-Mason ‘Invasion of privacy: common law v constitutional
delict — does it make a difference?’ (2000) Acta Juridica 229.
6 The term ‘private facts’will be deﬁned under II.1.b. Violations of privacy will be
discussed in more detail under II.2.b.
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society and may also be inﬂuenced by statute law.7 Fault, the third
component of an iniuria, is required in the form of intention.8
(2) Constitutional law
Under the Constitution,9 a two-stage analysis must be employed in deciding
whether the right to privacy was violated. First, the scope of the right must
be assessed to determine whether it has been infringed. If it is established that
the right has been violated, this violation will prima facie be regarded as
unlawful. It is then up to the person or body breaching the right to show that
the infringement was justiﬁable (second stage of the analysis).10 Other than a
delictual invasion, the breach of a constitutional right does not require
fault.11
(3) Relationship between the common law and constitutional law
There has been some debate about the relationship between the common
law and the constitutional law of privacy. Ngwena12 sees an advantage of the
constitutional right in its broader scope and applicability. However, his
understanding contradicts s 39(2) of the Constitution, which stipulates that
the courts must interpret the common law in light of the Constitution.
Burchell13 rightly argues that the constitutional right to privacy ‘will serve to
provide substance to any deﬁnition of privacy under the common law’.
7 The boni mores test is an objective test that balances the relevant conduct
against the values as well as the general sense of justice in society. Accordingly, the
conduct will not be deemed unlawful unless a person of ordinary sensibilities would
have regarded the conduct as offensive; see McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 232; Ian
Currie/Johan deWaal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) § 14 at 316.
8 Intention is the subjective will to injure the plaintiff, including knowledge of
the wrongfulness of the act. J Neethling/JM Potgieter/PJ Visser Law of Delict 5 ed
(2006) § 4 at 112. Such intention and knowledge are presumed unless proven other-
wise. Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461 (W) at 1213. McQuoid-
Mason argues that where the violation of privacy stems from a publication by the
media, negligent conduct is sufﬁcient. See McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 229;
234. This view was shared in the minority judgments of Langa J and O’Regan J in
NM and Others v Smith supra note 1 para 94; 177–178.
9 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter: the Consti-
tution).
10 Currie/De Waal op cit note 7 at 317; McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 246.
The terms and conditions under which an infringement will be considered justiﬁed
are set out in s 36 of the Constitution: the limitation clause. This clause states that a
constitutional right may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to
an extent that is reasonable and justiﬁable in an open and democratic society. In
establishing whether this is the case, the nature of both the right and the limitation, as
well as the purpose of the limitation and the availability of less restrictive means, need
to be considered (s 36 (1) of the Constitution).
11 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 245.
12 Charles Ngwena ‘HIV in the Workplace: protecting rights to equality and pri-
vacy’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 513 at 536.
13 Jonathan M Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern
Actio Iniuriarum (1998) at 395.
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McQuoid-Mason14 asks the valid question ‘common law v constitutional
delict — does it make a difference?’After deconstructing the factors that have
been adduced as the differences between the two, McQuoid-Mason
concludes that ‘many of the so-called distinctions between a ‘‘private law’’
delict [. . .] and a ‘‘public law’’ delict [. . .] are more apparent than real’.15 It
should be noted that one strong distinction is that the common law delict is
fault-based, whereas the constitutional delict is not.16 Accordingly, it remains
interesting to see whether the courts will accommodate delictual actions
from constitutional breaches of privacy under the common law and if yes,
how this will inﬂuence the development of the law of delict.17 It is, however,
neither the focus nor within the scope of this article to discuss this matter
further.18
(b) Defining privacy
Although the common law and constitutional law have the same under-
standing of privacy, there is still some controversy around the deﬁnition. Part
of the problem is that legal scholars and courts at times use the term ‘private’
to describe what is protected under the right to privacy.19 This is not only
tautological, but also unhelpful in assessing the meaning of privacy because
the word ‘private’ can be used in a number of ways.20
Jurisprudential interpretations often remain vague when deﬁning pri-
vacy.21 In Bernstein v Bester22 the Constitutional Court held that ‘there is a
14 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5.
15 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 246.
16 See note 11 above.
17 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 259, 260.
18 For further discussion see McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5.
19 J Neethling ‘The Concept of Privacy in SouthAfrican Law’ (2005) 122 (1) South
African Law Journal 20, ‘This condition embraces all those personal facts [. . .] of which
he has the will that they be kept private’. McQuoid-Mason speaks of ‘intrusions into a
person’s private life or affairs, or aspects of his or her ‘‘inner sanctum’’ ’ and, drawing
on case law, he lists ‘reading of private documents [. . .]; listening to private telephone
conversations’ as intrusions of privacy without clarifying why the courts have consid-
ered these documents and telephone conversations respectively to be considered
‘private’. McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 230. Ngwena, while highlighting the
inter-relation to other values, also refrains from concretising what privacy means. He
submits that privacy ‘serves to protect the individual’s dignity and personality by
proscribing unjustiﬁable intrusions into the private sphere’. Ngwena op cit note 12 at
533.
20 The word can, for example, be used in a solely descriptive sense, meaning that
something is ‘private’ because no one knows it other than the person that the infor-
mation is about (during the ﬁrst months of a woman’s pregnancy no one knows that
she is pregnant unless she discloses this information). The term ‘private’ can also be
employed in a normative sense, in that something is not necessarily unknown to
others, but should be kept unknown or treated as conﬁdential due to the nature of the
information. Yet again, customary and religious norms may require something to be
‘private’.
21 See for example Bernstein v Bester NO where the Constitutional Court held the
position that a legitimate expectation of privacy has two components: (1) a subjective
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ﬁnal untouchable sphere of human freedom [. . .] But this most intimate
score is narrowly construed’. Ackermann J reduced privacy to ‘the inner
sanctum of a person, such as his or her family life, sexual preference and
home environment’.23 More recently the Constitutional Court, drawing on
National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste,24 deﬁned ‘private facts’ as affairs ‘the
disclosure of which will cause mental distress and injury to anyone possessed
of ordinary feelings and intelligence [. . .] and in respect of which there is a
will to keep them private’.25 Neethling,26 objecting that the standard cannot
be the ‘(objective) reaction of a person of ordinary feelings’, insists that the
subjective perception of the person himself determines the scope of his
interest in privacy. He describes privacy as ‘a condition of human life
characterized by seclusion from the public’ embracing all the facts that a
person has ‘himself determined to be excluded from the knowledge of
outsiders’.27 The fact that the expectation of privacy must be objectively
reasonable is only considered under the element of wrongfulness.28 As a
result, one can make the argument that privacy does not only protect truly
intimate spheres such as family life, home environment and sexuality, but
also extends to personal matters that are not necessarily of an intimate nature,
but that a person wishes to keep out of the public domain for other legitimate
reasons.
The protection of privacy also extends to the area of data-collection
‘where the information collected about a person is often not of a most
personal nature, or some of the data, taken on their own, may not even be
private, [. . .] but the total picture thereof is usually of such a nature that the
person concerned determines [. . .] the data to be private’.29 Accordingly,
another aspect of the right to privacy is ‘informational privacy’, which
expectation of privacy that (2) the society has recognised as objectively reasonable.
Despite its limited practicability, the deﬁnition of the Constitutional Court highlights
the fact that the principles of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘the ordinary person’play an impor-
tant role in determining the scope of privacy. Bernstein v Bester NO supra note 4 para
75.
22 Ibid para 77.
23 Ibid para 67.Ackermann J’s deﬁnition was however not followed in the decision
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA545 (CC) 557.
24 National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste 1996 (3) SA262 (A).
25 NM and Others v Smith supra note 1 para 34.
26 J Neethling ‘The Right to Privacy, HIV/AIDS and Media Defendants’ (2008)
125 South African Law Journal 36 at 38.
27 Neethling op cit note 19 at 19.
28 Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO supra note 23 at 557.
29 Neethling op cit note 19 at 20. For example, an e-mail address taken on its own
is not considered as intimate information, because it is used for business and social
affairs. But together with other data (eg all the information that a user enters into a
proﬁle for an online shop) the information must be considered private if that is the
determination of the individual.
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restricts ‘the collection, use of and disclosure of personal information that has
been collected by others’.30
Over the last decades the compilation, processing and dissemination of
data has been fundamentally facilitated and advanced through electronic
technologies.31 The South African Law Reform Commission (hereafter:
SALRC) has recognised that these technologies increase the need for
effective data protection and has therefore suggested new statutory legisla-
tion that regulates the processing of data by public and private bodies. The
proposed ‘Protection of Personal Information Bill’ (hereafter: POPIB)
received a large volume of comments, which are currently reviewed by the
Law Reform Commission.32
Under the POPIB, the standard for processing health information is
stricter than the standard for other information.33 The processing of health
information is generally prohibited (s 24 POPIB). Section 29 POPIB,
however, sets out circumstances in which the prohibition does not apply.
Medical professionals, health care institutions or facilities, or social services,
for instance, may process health information (s 29(1)(a) POPIB). Although
the proposed POPIB seems to be generally supported for bringing South
African legislation in line with international standards, for providing ‘an
omnibus data protection Act’34 as well as for balancing the interests between
privacy and access to information, the implications of the legislation are at
this stage unclear. The Bill has not yet been introduced into Parliament.
Experience shows that in the course of parliamentary deliberations a
proposed statute may change considerably. Given that the format of the
30 Currie/De Waal op cit note 7 § 14 at 323. The challenges of privacy in the area
of data protection were comprehensively discussed in the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court in Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa
where the Constitutional Court considered the following facts relevant to establish
whether certain data qualiﬁed as private: whether the information was obtained in an
intrusive manner; whether the information was about intimate aspects of the appli-
cant’s personal life; whether the applicant provided the data for one purpose but it was
used for another and whether the information was disseminated to the press or the
general public or persons from whom the applicant could reasonably expect such
private information would be withheld. Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental
Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA1127 (CC) at para 51.
31 For more detail see Anneliese Roos ‘Data Protection: Explaining the Interna-
tional Backdrop and Evaluating the Current SouthAfrican Position’ (2007) 124 South
African Law Journal 400 at 401.
32 Kate Allan/Iain Currie ‘Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights:
Evaluating Proposals for an Information Protection Regulator for South Africa’
(2007) 23 South African Journal of Human Rights 570. SALRC (2005) Privacy and Data
Protection, Discussion Paper 109, Annex B, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/
dpapers.htm (last accessed 14 October 2008).
33 Generally, information has to be processed ‘in accordance with the law and in a
proper and careful manner in order not to intrude upon the privacy of the data subject
to an unreasonable extent’ (s 7 POPIB).
34 Roos op cit note 31 at 406; 433;Allan/Currie op cit note 32 at 586.
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(ﬁnal) legislation as well as its enactment are uncertain, the draft legislation
will not be discussed in more detail.
(c) Confidentiality
One aspect of privacy is conﬁdentiality. The existence of a special
relationship between two parties can render information disclosed between
such parties conﬁdential, whereas the same information would not be
considered conﬁdential had it been exchanged outside of such a relationship.
The law, in certain circumstances, recognises conﬁdential relationships
between parties and protects the information shared between them under
the right to privacy. Special relationships may exist inter alia between a
religious ﬁgure and a member of the congregation,35 an attorney and his
client,36 the police and their informant37 and a doctor and his patient.38 The
reason for considering their exchange of information as conﬁdential stems
from the nature of the parties’ relationship marked by trust and a justiﬁable
expectation that the information exchanged between them will not be
shared with others.
The relationship between doctors and patients is particularly relevant for
the forthcoming discussions. Conﬁdentiality forms the basis of the special
relationship between a patient and a health care professional (hereafter:
HCP39). The principle of conﬁdentiality states that a person should be
entitled to privacy with regard to his most personal physical and psychologi-
cal conditions.40 Medical conﬁdentiality therefore casts a duty upon HCPs to
keep secret and conﬁdential any and all information relating to a patient that
has been obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the HCP-patient
relationship.
However, there are signiﬁcant conceptual differences between the right to
privacy and conﬁdentiality. The right to privacy can be invoked directly to
prevent the government or any person from gaining access to personal
information and to hold them legally accountable if they have gained access
improperly. Conﬁdentiality on the other hand only binds certain individuals,
in this case HCPs, and has, until the recent enactment of the National Health
35 O v O 1995 (4) SA482 (W) 490.
36 Conversations between a lawyer and his or her client are furthermore protected
by the legal professional privilege. Communications between the two cannot be
disclosed in court without the client’s consent. See PJ Schwikkard/S E Van der
Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) § 10 at 134.
37 Swanepol v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 (4) SA549 (T).
38 Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger 1993 (4) SA842 (A).
39 The term ‘health care professional’ is used as a general term for doctors and
nurses dealing with patients in a health care facility or setting. It refers to male and
female persons.
40 Jerold L Taitz Medical Confidentiality and the Law in South Africa (1990) at 1 as
quoted in Jerold L Taitz ‘AIDS Patients Are Entitled To The Right Of Medical
Conﬁdentiality’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 577.
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Act41 (hereafter: NHA), only encompassed an ethical duty.42 In order to
strengthen patients’ rights, the NHA upgrades the ethical principle of
conﬁdentiality to a binding statutory principle and clariﬁes that informed
consent is required for health services such as HIV tests.43 In addition to the
NHA, guidelines of various professional bodies, some of which are
HIV-speciﬁc,44 require HCPs to keep patients’ health information conﬁden-
tial. The guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South Africa
(hereafter: HPCSA), for instance, state that the test results of HIV-positive
41 National HealthAct 61 of 2003. The NHA is a comprehensive piece of medical
legislation that applies to both public and private health care facilities. It entails
detailed provisions for the protection of conﬁdentiality, emphasising that all informa-
tion concerning a user of a health facility, including information relating to his or her
health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment is conﬁdential (s 14 NHA).
Conﬁdential information may be disclosed only with the patient’s informed consent
in writing (s 14(2) NHA). The legislation does however allow breaches of conﬁdenti-
ality in certain circumstances. If, for instance, a court order or any law requires the
disclosure of speciﬁc health information, the consent of the patient is not required for
such disclosure (s 14(2) NHA). Consent is furthermore essential for the provision of
health services. Health services may not be provided to a patient without his or her
informed consent (s 7(1) NHA). For consent to be valid, the person giving such
consent must be legally competent to do so, must clearly understand the implications
of the consent and must have adequate information to make an informed decision
without coercion or threat; See G J Knobel (2006) ‘Consent, with particular refer-
ence to HIV and AIDS’ (2006) 24 South Africa’s Continuing Medical Education Monthly
79. It should be noted that the NHA also provides for exceptions from the principle
of informed consent; as these principles are irrelevant to this article they will not be
further discussed.
42 Generally, non-compliance with an ethical duty or a duty under a policy does
not per se constitute an act that is legally actionable but may result in disciplinary
measures by the relevant oversight body of the profession. A policy breach may how-
ever provide grounds for a claim; see Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger
supra note 38 at 850E–F.
43 See s 7 NHA. However, certain aspects of the provisions regarding conﬁdential-
ity remain problematic. Whereas it may be appropriate to waive the patient’s consent
if a court order requires the disclosure of medical information, it seems alarming that
the legislation allows HCPs to disclose conﬁdential medical information ‘to any other
person [. . .] or health establishment as is necessary for any legitimate purpose within
the ordinary course and scope of his or her duties where such access or disclosure is in
the interests of the user’ (s 15(1) NHA). The legislation is unclear about who decides
what a legitimate purpose is, what is ‘within the ordinary course and scope’ of the
HCP’s duties, and what is ‘in the interest of the user’. Discretion of the HCP may
entail insecurity and risks for the patient. One apprehension is that an HCP might
think that a disclosure of the patient’s disease is necessary for other HCPs treating the
patient, assuming that such warning of colleagues might also be in the interest of the
patient. The principle of informed consent had been recognised by the common law
in Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) and Castell v De Greef
1994 (4) SA408 (C).
44 Health Professions Council of South Africa ‘Guidelines for the Management of
Patients with HIV or AIDS’ (n.d.). The South African Medical Association, a profes-
sional organisation for public and private sector medical practitioners, developed the
Human Rights and Ethical Guidelines on HIV andAIDS.
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patients should be treated ‘at the highest level of conﬁdentiality’.45 Aspects of
these guidelines will be discussed in more detail below.46
(d) Distinction from other rights
Privacy is closely related to other human rights and personality interests. In
NM and Others v Smith and Others O’Regan J characterises ‘privacy, liberty
and dignity as the key constitutional rights which construct our understand-
ing of what it means to be a human being’.47 It has been said that the right to
privacy protects a ‘sphere of intimacy and autonomy’48, it ‘foster[s] human
dignity’.49 A core value served by privacy is thus dignity.50
Whether there has been a violation of privacy is, however, in no way
dependent on whether there has been an infringement of dignity. Most
scholars agree that privacy is an interest independent from dignity under both
the common law and the constitutional law.51 In many instances of invasion
of privacy there is, in fact, no question of having harmed a person’s dignity;
for example, where laudable personal facts are published contrary to the will
and desire of the victim.52 The right to privacy guarantees control over all
private information and, contrary to dignity, a violation of privacy does not
require information to be potentially damaging.53
According to Neethling,54 privacy must also be distinguished from the
right to identity. He opines that privacy — being a condition of life
characterised by seclusion from publicity — can be infringed only through a
disclosure of true private facts.55 Identity — a person’s uniqueness — on the
other hand, can only be violated by a falsiﬁcation of his true image.56
Other scholars57 reject the existence of an independent right to identity
45 HPCSAGuidelines for the Management of Patients with HIV or AIDS (n.d.) at 10.1.
46 See III.2.
47 NM and Others v Smith supra note 1 para 131.
48 Neethling op cit note 19 at 23.
49 Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO supra note 23 at 557.
50 Dignity is protected by the constitutional law (s 10 Constitution) and the com-
mon law. Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 10 at 321.
51 See Neethling op cit note 19 at 23; Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 10 at 322;
Currie/De Waal op cit 7 § 14 at 316; McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 229. This
assumption is conﬁrmed by the separate provisions for privacy (s 14 of the Constitu-
tion) and dignity (s 10 of the Constitution) in the Constitution. McQuoid-Mason
however adds that the strict distinction is only a tool to classify various forms of
invasions of privacy under an action for an iniuria.
52 Neethling op cit note 19 at 23.
53 Currie/DeWaal op cit 7 § 14 at 323.
54 Neethling op cit note 19 at 24; Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 10 at 324.
55 In a case of infringement of privacy, the name, likeness or other personal charac-
teristics which identify the person in question are used in a (truthful) manner exclu-
sive to him; Neethling op cit note 19 at 24.
56 According to Neethling, truthfulness is an element of the infringement of pri-
vacy, while falsity is an element of the infringement of identity; Neethling op cit note
19 at 24.
57 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5; Burchell op cit note 13 at 334; 395.
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and regard placing a person in a ‘false light’ as a form of invasion of privacy.
McQuoid-Mason58, for instance, sees the core violation of placing a person
in a false light in the ‘unwanted publicity’ it creates. In his opinion ‘false light’
cases thus need to be covered under privacy because, even though the
information has been falsiﬁed, the actual invasion is the unwanted publicity.
2 HIV/AIDS AND PRIVACY
Although the protection of privacy is a core interest for HIV-infected
individuals, as will be shown in this section, local literature on the subject
remains scarce. So far only few scholars have discussed privacy in the light of
HIV/AIDS and most of the few who have focus on a particular aspect of
privacy.59 Case law on the matter is also limited.60
(a) Protection of HIV status under the right to privacy
Most people would consider their HIV status to be a private affair, because
due to the way of transmission and the lack of a cure, HIV is a condition
related to sex, death and disease — topics that allude to the most existential
aspects of life and are therefore perceived as highly intimate. That a person’s
HIV status is a private fact was conﬁrmed in NM and Others v Smith and
Others where Madala J acknowledged that an individual’s HIV status
‘deserves protection against indiscriminate disclosure due to the nature and
negative social context the disease has as well as the potential intolerance and
discrimination that results from its disclosure’.61 He also emphasised the
importance of the protection of privacy to ‘encourage individuals to seek
treatment and divulge information encouraging disclosure of HIV’ and to
initiate ‘improvement of public health policies on HIV/AIDS’.62
58 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 231.
59 Neethling op cit note 26 focuses on the recent judgment NM and Others v Smith
and the liability of media defendants. See also: Ngwena op cit note 12; Simeon Maile
‘Legal Aspects of the disclosure of HIV serostatus by educators’ (2003) 23 (1) South
African Journal of Education 78). Other publications focus solely on conﬁdentiality:
Mark Heywood ‘Conﬁdentiality or bust’ (1998) AIDS Legal Quarterly 11; Fatima
Hassan ‘Conﬁdentiality: tool of the trade’ (1998) AIDS Legal Quarterly; Taitz op cit
note 40.
60 Neethling contention that ‘in the recent past the courts have often been con-
fronted with the protection of a person’s right to privacy in connection with his or her
HIV/AIDS status’ (emphasis added) seems doubtful. The adjudication of four cases —
three of which will be mentioned here — on a person’s right to privacy in the context
of HIV/AIDS over a period of 15 years suggests that case law is rather limited. See
Neethling op cit note 19 at 37.
61 NM and Others v Smith supra note 1 para 42.
62 Ibid.
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(b) Violations of privacy in the context of HIV/AIDS
Neethling63 categorises invasions of privacy into two types: a person intrudes
into the private sphere of another;64 or a person discloses or reveals another’s
personal facts.65 These types of infringements also apply in the context of
HIV/AIDS.
(1) Unauthorised blood tests
The ﬁrst type of infringement takes place where insurance companies,
employers or others perform an HIV test on a blood sample without the
informed consent of the person whose blood is tested.66 The case of an
unauthorised blood test for HIV was dealt with in C v Minister of Correctional
Services67 where the High Court found that such a test violated the prisoner’s
right to privacy.68
(2) Non-consensual HIV disclosure
There are two examples of the second type of infringement. Jansen van
Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger,69 the earliest jurisprudential paradigm,
dealt with a non-consensual disclosure of a patient’s HIV status. The case
presented itself as a promising start for developing the common law on
privacy and HIV/AIDS.70 Recently, the Constitutional Court made its ﬁrst
63 Neethling op cit note 19 at 21.
64 That is where an outsider comes into contact with a person or obtains informa-
tion about his personal affairs.
65 That is where one party exposes an individual or personal affairs of an individual
to a third party against the will of the former.
66 Aids Law Project ‘HIV/AIDS — Current Law and Policy: Privacy and conﬁ-
dentiality’ (2004) at 9; 11; 12; Ngwena op cit note 12 at 533.
67 C v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 JOL407 (T).
68 The case dealt with a delictual action for damages based on a non-consensual
HIV test. The Department of Correctional Services had taken a blood sample from an
inmate which was, at a later point, subjected to an HIV test without the plaintiff’s
informed consent. The court stipulated that testing for HIV in prisons must be under-
taken in accordance with the relevant Correctional Services Protocol which — right-
fully — required informed consent for an HIV test. Testing the plaintiff without
informed consent thus violated his common law right to privacy and led to the
granting of damages. See speciﬁcally C v Minister of Correctional Services supra at 431;
438; 441.
69 Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger supra note 38.
70 In this delictual case the plaintiff’s doctor disclosed the plaintiff’s HIV status
without authorisation to two of his friends. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the
plaintiff, holding that the defendant had breached the plaintiff’s right to conﬁdential-
ity by disclosing his HIV status without authorisation. The Court ordered the defen-
dant to pay damages of R5 000. The Supreme Court made it clear that enforcing
medical conﬁdentiality was vital for the protection of patient’s privacy. The Supreme
Court took a progressive approach by expressly endorsing the ﬁndings of the English
case X v Y & others (1988 2 All ER 648 (QB)) that ‘in the long run, preservation of
conﬁdentiality is the only way of securing public health’ because if people fear
breaches of conﬁdentiality, patients will in future not come forward. Unless infected
persons come forward, they cannot be counselled and treated and will infect other
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ruling on an HIV disclosure and its implications in NM and Others v Smith.71
The court heard the case of three women whose HIV status was revealed in a
book without authorisation. The court’s decision has been thoroughly
discussed by Neethling72 and Scott.73
(3) Imputation of HIV infection — a violation of privacy?
Apotential example of an infringement of privacy that magistrates often have
to deal with is where one person publicly accuses someone of being infected
with HIV or having AIDS, although such person is not infected with the
virus.74 It is doubtful whether this kind of behaviour would amount to an
infringement of privacy.
As noted earlier, McQuoid-Mason’s understanding of a violation of
privacy includes placing a person in a false light, in cases where the law of
defamation does not cover the conduct.75 Thus, publicly imputing that a
person is infected with HIV/AIDS would constitute an invasion of privacy.
However, according to Neethling76 an infringement of privacy is only
possible where true personal facts are used in a manner exclusive to the
individual. Therefore, the described false imputation would not constitute
an invasion of privacy. It is submitted that an accusation in relation to HIV
would not constitute defamation.77 McQuoid-Mason’s view that although
the facts are untrue, the conduct exposes the person to unwanted publicity is
individuals. Furthermore, Joubert JA acknowledged the severity of consequences of
non-consensual HIV disclosure by recognising that the ‘[d]isclosure of the condition
has serious personal and social consequences for the patient. He is often isolated or
rejected by others, which may lead to increased anxiety, depression and psychological
conditions that tend to hasten the onset of so-called full blownAIDS’. See Jansen van
Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger supra at 854I–J.
71 NM and Others v Smith supra note 1.
72 Neethling op cit note 26.
73 Helen Scott ‘Liability for the Mass Publication of Private Information in South
African Law: NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae)’
2007 18 Stellenbosch Law Review 387.
74 The author facilitated discussions around HIV/AIDS and privacy and HIV/
AIDS and crimen iniuria between magistrates at workshops in various South African
provinces. A very high number of magistrates had heard cases where one person had
accused another person of being infected with HIVor havingAIDS.
75 See the discussion on ‘false light’cases under II.1.d.
76 See references in note 54.
77 This question will be discussed in more detail in a forthcoming article by the
same author. In short: For defamation to be wrongful a ‘reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence and development’ must consider the conduct to have the tendency to
undermine, subvert or impair a person’s good name or reputation. Due to the objec-
tive nature of the civil defamation test, it is the values of the constitutional Bill of
Rights that need to be considered when establishing what a reasonable or right-
thinking person would regard as defamatory. Given that a reasonable person, ie a
person with appropriate constitutional values, would not look down on someone
because of the statement, it cannot be regarded as defamatory, even if it is a view held
by the majority of South Africans. The line of argument is based on Kok, who has
made the same argument when testing whether an imputation of homosexuality is
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weak, because what is unwanted is the publication of these particular facts
that are false, not the publicity. Neethling’s approach to require truthfulness
appears more appropriate. False facts cannot be regarded as part of the person
or of his personal affairs. Though it may be difﬁcult, the protection of an
individual’s ‘true image’ought to be ensured through other legal tools such as
the right to identity,78 defamation79 or crimen iniuria. If none of the existing
legal remedies is applicable then the conduct is lawful. This result may seem
unsatisfactory, because a person who is accused of having AIDS can surely
feel violated and the imputation may lead to negative consequences such as
discrimination or harassment. Legal remedies may be available for such
negative consequences though.80
(4) Effects of infringements
Currie and De Waal’s81 assumption that privacy is protected for the
realisation of other values is particularly true in the context of HIV/AIDS. A
non-consensual HIV disclosure may put the HIV-infected individual at risk
for further human rights violations. Fombad82 highlights that an unautho-
rised HIV disclosure may lead to rejection, ostracism and discrimination.
Barrett-Grant et al83 conﬁrm that people with HIV/AIDS are refused
employment, membership in employee beneﬁt schemes, life insurance,
bonds, proper health care and equal membership of medical aid schemes.
Research shows that people living with HIV/AIDS generally, and women in
particular, are also at risk for violence, sexual abuse and abandonment after
HIV disclosure.84 HIV disclosure puts women at risk for loss of economic
support, blame, abandonment, physical and emotional abuse, discrimination
defamatory. See Anton Kok ‘Homosexuality, The Bill of Rights and the Unlawful-
ness Criterion in the Law of Delict’ (2001) 118 South African Law Journal 102 at 106.
78 The problem with this approach is, however, that the right to identity may not
be constitutionally protected, unless it is regarded as part of the right to dignity;
McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 231. The Constitutional Court acknowledged in
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice that the right to
dignity includes an individual’s identity, stating that ‘the violation of dignity under
section 10 [. . .] offers protection to persons in their multiple identities and capacities’,
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (CCT 11/98) para
120 available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.html (last accessed 27
October 2008).
79 The law on defamation is also not inapplicable, see note 78 above.
80 The problem itself is not a legal one. What needs to be addressed are the stigma
around the disease and society’s negative attitudes towards HIV-infected individuals.
81 Currie/DeWaal op cit note 7 § 14 at 320.
82 Charles Manga Fombad ‘The crisis of conﬁdentiality in the control of the HIV/
AIDS pandemic in Botswana’ (2001) 43 International Social Science Journal 649;
Fombad furthermore claims that ‘no disease in history has had the stigma attached to
it that HIV/AIDS has had’; Ibid at 644.
83 Kitty Barrett-Grant/Derrick Fine/Mark Heywood/Ann Strode HIV/AIDS
and the Law — A resource manual 2 ed (2001) § 2.4.4 at 38.
84 L Vetten/K Bhana Violence, Vengeance and Gender — A preliminary investigation
into the links between violence against women and HIV/AIDS in South Africa (2001) at 11;
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and disruption of family relationships.85 The protection of privacy is
therefore crucial for the fulﬁlment of other rights such as physical and
psychological integrity86 and equality.87 While negative effects may also
occur where a person discloses his HIV status voluntarily, the latter might be
more prepared for negative consequences and might know how to react to
threats of violence and discrimination.
(c) Adequate protection?
Notwithstanding the recognition of privacy under South African law, it
remains doubtful whether the right adequately protects HIV-positive people.
Some scholars88 argue that whilst the right can serve as an important
deterrent, it is otherwise of limited utility because the adjudication
necessarily renders public what the person wishes to keep private. According
to Ngwena,89 ‘[l]itigation is a disincentive as it brings the matter into the
public arena, and thus paradoxically assuring an even wider dissemination of
the very information that the plaintiff is seeking to protect’. Given that in the
majority of cases the plaintiff will enforce the right only after it has been
invaded, the right merely offers remedies for an irrevocable violation.
This criticism can partially be contested. Firstly, the court can apply
‘protective measures’ like hearing the case in camera and/or ordering that the
plaintiff’s name not be published. However, in the light of HIV speciﬁcally,
tedious lawsuits remain problematic. Where the disease has progressed to
AIDS, time may be crucial for an HIV-infected plaintiff because the disease is
fatal. Of further concern are the expenses of an ongoing trial. Medical care
for HIV is costly and the plaintiff might not have sufﬁcient means for both
litigation and medication.90 These limitations may however be overcome
once broader access to antiretroviral treatment is available, which will keep
HIV-infected people healthy for longer and might increase their willingness
and ability to claim their rights before the courts. Furthermore, it should be
acknowledged that the right sets non-negotiable standards for the actions of
government as well as private persons.
Secondly, the common law provides an interdict to restrain an invasion of
privacy as an alternative to a time consuming trial.91 An interdict requires
that the respondent has commenced or is threatening to commit an unlawful
Women are more vulnerable to violence due to gender inequalities and due to their
low status in society.
85 This will be discussed in more detail below under III.2.c.
86 Bodily integrity is protected under both the common law and the constitutional
law. See Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 10 at 321 and s 12(2) of the Constitution.
87 The right to equality is protected under s 9 of the Constitution.
88 Ngwena op cit note 41 at 535; 537; Matthew Weait ‘Harm, Consent and the
Limits of Privacy’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 98.
89 Ngwena op cit note 41 at 535.
90 Ibid at 535.
91 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 5 at 235.
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act and that this act cannot be prevented in any other way.92 Therefore, if the
court is satisﬁed that the applicant has a reasonable apprehension that his
privacy will be irreparably injured and that there is no other remedy
available, it will grant an interdict. This remedy is only feasible though where
the applicant knew that the violation of privacy was imminent or where the
right has already been invaded, which implies the irrevocable injury
mentioned earlier.
III PART II: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS & THE
LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY
Privacy, like any other right, is not absolute. The right may be limited where
it interferes with the rights of other individuals or the public, or the interests
of the state. In the context of HIV/AIDS, privacy is particularly problematic
in sexual relationships because an HIV disclosure may be crucial for the
protection of uninfected sexual partners. Ideally, an HIV-infected individual
would disclose his or her HIV status before engaging in risky sexual
behaviour.93 But what if an HIV-infected individual refuses to disclose his
HIV status to his partner? Does the HCP who diagnosed the disease then
have a duty to warn the partner? In answering this question the article will
discuss public health interventions such as making HIV a notiﬁable disease
and partner notiﬁcation schemes, their implications on the right to privacy
and their potential risks and beneﬁts.
In addition to consensual sexual relationships, this section will scrutinise
the justiﬁability of public health measures in the area of non-consensual
sexual relations, speciﬁcally sexual offences. The newly enacted provisions
on compulsory HIV testing of alleged sexual offenders seriously limit the
right to privacy. But do they do so for the beneﬁt of the victim?
92 Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 7 at 236.
93 Every person is under a moral duty not to expose others to harm. However, at
present SouthAfrican law does not recognise a legal duty to disclose an HIV infection
to a sexual partner. There is neither an HIV-speciﬁc statute nor a common law
offence dealing with HIV disclosure or exposure per se. Yet, there is an ‘indirect’ legal
duty, because an HIV-positive person could face criminal charges for exposing some-
one to HIV or for transmitting the disease. Possible criminal charges under the com-
mon law include (attempted) murder, homicide, and assault. Given that a number of
prosecutorial difﬁculties arise (eg to provide evidence on the knowledge and inten-
tion to transmit the virus; causation), it may be very difﬁcult to secure a conviction for
these common law crimes though. During the recent law reform process regarding
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)AmendmentAct, the crimi-
nalisation of non-disclosure of HIV/AIDS was discussed, but the proposed provisions
were not included in the Act. See Sarai Chisala ‘Rape and HIV/AIDS: Who’s Pro-
tecting Whom?’ § 3 at 52–70 in LArtz/D Smythe (eds) Should We Consent? Rape Law
Reform in South Africa (2008).
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1 PRIVACY & NOTIFIABILITY
One public health intervention that was particularly sought in the United
States (U.S.)94 but also discussed in South Africa was to make either HIV, or
AIDS, or both notiﬁable diseases. Where a disease has been declared
‘notiﬁable’, HCPs diagnosing the disease must inform the local health
authorities. The purpose of creating categories of notiﬁable diseases can be
active or passive disease control. Active disease control serves to locate and
contact infected individuals and possibly submit them to coercive measures
(for instance isolation).95 The rationale of passive disease control is to enable
accurate surveillance of the spread of a disease.96 AlthoughAIDS was listed as
a communicable disease in terms of the 1987 ‘Regulations relating to
Communicable Diseases and the Notiﬁcation of Notiﬁable Medical Condi-
tions’ its mandatory reporting was never enforced.97 Subsequent policies
relating to notiﬁable medical conditions did not include AIDS.98 Despite
government’s (renewed) intention to make AIDS a notiﬁable disease in
1999, this plan was not put into practice.99 At the Health Summit in 2001,
public health experts concurred that HIV and AIDS should not be made
notiﬁable diseases because ‘the stigma was too high’.100
The decision to keep HIV and AIDS off the list of notiﬁable diseases is
commendable because compulsory case reporting of HIV/AIDS is not an
effective public health measure. Making HIV or AIDS a notiﬁable condition
94 In the U.S. all states have legislation requiring health care professionals to report
cases of AIDS to state health departments. Centres for Disease Control and Preven-
tion ‘Current Trends Update: Public Health Surveillance for HIV Infection —
United States, 1989 and 1990’ (1990) 39 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 853 at
859–861 available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001846.htm
(last accessed 22 September 2008).
95 SALRC Aspects of the Law Relating to Aids – Working Paper 85 (1995) at 149.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid at 151; Edwin Cameron / Edward Swanson ‘Public Health and Human
Rights — The AIDS Crisis in South Africa’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human
Rights 200 at 217.
98 See Government Notice No. R.328 of February 1991 ‘Declaration of Medical
Conditions to be Notiﬁable Medical Conditions in Terms of the Health Act, 1977
(Act 63 of 1977)’. Notice No. R.328 was declared under the National HealthAct 63
of 1977 which has, in its entirety, been replaced by the NHA. The author was unable
to ﬁnd any new Regulations on notiﬁable medical conditions. It is however clear
from other documents by the Department of Health that AIDS has not been reintro-
duced to the list of notiﬁable diseases. See, for instance, the Department’s latest
reports on the prevalence of notiﬁable diseases, available at
http://www.doh.gov.za/facts/notify/index.html (last accessed 19 September 2008).
99 Adele Baleta ‘Zuma defends decision to make AIDS a notiﬁable disease’ (1999)
353 The Lancet 1599.
100 Nono Simelela ‘HIV/AIDS and TB: The dual epidemic and its challenges’
Discussion Paper by the Department of Health, Health Summit 2001, available at
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/misc/Departmenthsummit01/section2c.pdf (last accessed 19
September 2008).
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is unnecessary for passive disease control. As Cameron and Swanson101
rightly point out, ‘[a]nonymous testing of blood samples collected for other
purposes and unlinked from any personal information identifying the source
of the blood’ are just as useful for surveillance purposes as data obtained
through compulsory case reporting, without the effect of infringing on
privacy. In recent years, a number of HIV/AIDS prevalence and incidence
studies have been successfully undertaken without HIV/AIDS being a
notiﬁable disease.102
With regard to active disease control, it needs to be emphasised that
HIV/AIDS differs from other communicable diseases in that it is not
transmissible through casual contact between infected and uninfected
individuals. Furthermore, it remains unclear how making HIV/AIDS a
notiﬁable disease per se could have a positive impact on public health. Surely,
notiﬁability would have to be combined with other public health measures
like partner notiﬁcation to prevent the further spread of the disease. The
potential beneﬁts and drawbacks of partner notiﬁcation will now be
discussed.
2 PRIVACY & PARTNER NOTIFICATION
Governments from all over the world have raised the issue of whether the
principles of conﬁdentiality and informed consent hindered efforts to
prevent the spread of HIV.103 Particular concern has been expressed
regarding the vulnerability of women to infection if their partners did not
know their status, refused to disclose it or objected to practising safer sex.104
One way of preventing the transmission of HIV to sexual partners was
thought to be partner notiﬁcation.105 This is a process of identifying and
contacting the sexual partner(s) of an individual who has a sexually
transmitted infection and informing them that they have been exposed to
HIV infection. The notiﬁcation can be undertaken by the patient who was
tested for HIV (source patient/client) himself, by the HCP or through their
101 Cameron/Swanson op cit note 97 at 228.
102 Rob Dorrington/Leigh Johnson/Debbie Bradshaw/Timothy-John Daniel
(2006) ‘The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: National and Provincial
Indicators for 2006’; O Shisana/T Rehle/L Simbayi/W Parker/K Zuma/A Bhana/C
Connolly/Jooste S/V Pillay (eds) (2005) South African National HIV Prevalence, HIV
Incidence, Behaviour and Communication Survey, 2005; UNAIDS/WHO (2006) Epi-
demic Update: December 2006 available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/
2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf (last accessed 9 October 2007).
103 Susan Timberlake (UNAIDS) ‘Opening up the HIV/AIDS epidemic — Guidance
on encouraging beneficial disclosure, ethical partner counselling & appropriate use of HIV case-
reporting’ (2000) at 5.
104 Ibid.
105 UNAIDS suggested the use of the term ‘partner counselling’, because ‘partner
notiﬁcation’ may be associated with coercion and pressure. See Timberlake op cit
note 103 at 18.
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combined efforts.106 The following section focuses on the notiﬁcation of the
sexual partner by an HCP.107
(a) Comparative approaches to partner notification
UNAIDS and the Canadian Advisory Committee on AIDS make similar
recommendations regarding partner notiﬁcation.108 Emphasising the need
for respect for the human rights of the source client and his partner, both
organisations require that the source client be thoroughly counselled as to
the need for partner notiﬁcation in order to obtain his consent.109 Only in
limited circumstances should a notiﬁcation be considered without the source
patient’s consent. This is where the source client (1) fails to apply appropriate
behavioural changes, ie to practise safer sex; and (2) his partner is clearly
identiﬁable; and (3) at real risk of HIV transmission, or has little reason to
suspect that he is at risk.110 In the case of a non-consensual partner
notiﬁcation, the source client must be given advance notice of the HCP’s
intention to notify the partner.111 The identity of the source client should not
be disclosed during the notiﬁcation.112 UNAIDS acknowledges that this
may not be feasible in practice, because in monogamous relationships the
106 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 32.
107 The terms ‘patient’, ‘source patient/client’ and ‘partner’ will be used in the
‘masculine’ form but should be read as referring to both males and females unless
stated otherwise.
108 Timberlake op cit note 103; Canadian Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory
Committee on AIDS (1997) Guidelines for Practice for Partner Notification in HIV/
AIDS. The Canadian guidelines were developed to provide a framework that prov-
inces and territories in Canada can use to shape their partner notiﬁcation
programmes. Ralf Jurgens HIV testing and Conﬁdentiality: Final Report (2001) at
364 available at http://library.catie.ca/PDF/P42/16067.pdf (last accessed 27 October
2008). More recently, a different Canadian working group has revisited the issue of
partner notiﬁcation and made recommendations for a legal framework for consider-
ation by the provinces and territories. See Ronda Bessner ‘Persons who fail to disclose
their HIV/AIDS status: Conclusions reached by an Expert Working Group’ (2005)
31 Canada Communicable Disease Report 53. However, the working group’s sugges-
tions have not replaced theAdvisory Committee’s guidelines.
109 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 22; Canadian Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Advisory Committee on AIDS Guidelines for Practice for Partner Notification in HIV/
AIDS at 6–7 as quoted by Jurgens op cit note 108 at 364–365.
110 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 22; Canadian Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Advisory Committee onAIDS at 6–7 as quoted by Jurgens op cit note 108.
111 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 22.
112 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 22; The Canadian guidelines are very detailed
when it comes to the importance of protecting the identity of the source client. They
set out that (1) disclosure of the names of the partner(s) must be voluntary, non-
coercive and non-prejudicial; (2) strict conﬁdentiality of all information concerning
both the source client (including his identity) and the partner(s) be maintained; and
(3) when partners are told of the possibility of HIV exposure, no additional informa-
tion be given which may identify the source patient. Canadian Federal/Provincial/
Territorial Advisory Committee on AIDS Guidelines for Practice for Partner Notification
in HIV/AIDS at 6–7 as quoted by Jurgens op cit note 108 at 364–365.
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notiﬁed partner will know who put them at risk. 113 The Canadian and
UNAIDS guidelines furthermore envision that it should be ensured that
‘social and legal support for the source client and other relevant parties’ are
available because, according to UNAIDS, these may be necessary ‘to protect
them from any physical abuse, discrimination and stigma which may result
from partner counselling’.114
It is laudable that UNAIDS and the Canadian Advisory Committee
attempt to protect privacy where possible. Furthermore, the precautions that
need to be taken before a non-consensual notiﬁcation prevent HCPs from
regarding notiﬁcation as ‘standard practice’. However, the UNAIDS and
Canadian principles are based on an idealistic setting (eg the availability of
social and legal support; the HCP’s ability to counsel the source client
repeatedly) that regularly does not exist in resource-poor settings. In
addition, UNAIDS’ contention that only few properly counselled patients
would refuse to disclose their status115 is doubtful and will depend on
sociological factors such as the overall levels of acceptance of HIV-infected
people and stigma as well as personal factors like the prevalence of
inter-personal violence in the source patient’s relationship.116
The American Medical Association developed a policy on ‘HIV/AIDS
Reporting, Conﬁdentiality, and Notiﬁcation’, which includes comparable,
but less detailed provisions on partner notiﬁcation.117 The Association
strongly recommends that states adopt contact-tracing and partner notiﬁca-
tion systems to provide clear guidelines for public health authorities and
physicians. The guidelines request that the HCP try to persuade the source
patient to ‘cease all activities that endanger unsuspecting others and inform
those whom he [. . .] might have infected’.118 Where this attempt fails,
notiﬁcation that protects ‘to the greatest extent possible’ the conﬁdentiality
of the source patient should follow.119
Interestingly, the Canadian and American guidelines by professional
bodies are not necessarily reﬂected in legislation. Jurgens’120 research shows
113 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 22.
114 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 7; Canadian Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advi-
sory Committee onAIDS Guidelines for Practice for Partner Notification in HIV/AIDS at
6–7 as quoted by Jurgens op cit note 108 at 364–365. According to the Canadian
guidelines, the notiﬁcation must also be delivered in a language and form that is
understandable and culturally sensitive. Ibid.
115 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 7.
116 This will be addressed in more detail below.
117 American Medical Association HIV/AIDS Reporting, Confidentiality, and Notifi-
cation (n.d.).
118 Ibid at H–20.915 (3).
119 According to the policy standards, this must also include the physician’s right to
exercise ethical and clinical judgement. Ibid.
120 In Canada, some provinces require partner notiﬁcation, while other states allow
partner notiﬁcation, and in other parts of the country legislation concerning partner
notiﬁcation is non-existent. The situation in the U.S. is similar. At least 33 American
states have enacted HIV/AIDS-speciﬁc partner notiﬁcation laws varying from obli-
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that legislation on partner notiﬁcation in Canada and the U.S. differs
substantially from state to state. But then again, legislation and practice may
also be inconsistent.121 A few U.S. programmes take the risk of intimate
partner violence after notiﬁcation into account. Timberlake122 points out
that New York, for instance, although known for its rigid notiﬁcation
scheme, implemented domestic violence screening into their partner
notiﬁcation system. In California notiﬁcation is deferred indeﬁnitely where a
violent reaction by the partner is expected.123
(b) The South African approach
(1) Partner notification in South Africa
Unwillingness of a patient to disclose his HIV status and to use condoms
clearly puts his partner at risk for infection. Whereas North American
countries aim to protect the sexual partner through notiﬁcation pro-
grammes, such programmes do not exist in South Africa. However, the
HPCSA and the South African Medical Association124 (hereafter: SAMA)
both developed guidelines that provide advice for HCPs on how to act in
situations where the patient refuses to disclose his status and to practise safer
sex.125
The HPCSA’s guidelines emphasise that any decision on the disclosure of
the HIV status must generally be made in consultation with the patient, but
‘[i]f the patient’s consent cannot be obtained, ethical guidelines recommend
that the HCP should use his discretion whether or not to divulge the
information to other parties involved who are at clear risk or danger’.126
Under the HPCSA’s policy the HCP must follow a certain procedure
before informing the sexual partner(s). First, the HCP has to counsel the
patient on the importance of disclosing the HIV status to his sexual partner(s)
and of applying appropriate behavioural changes to prevent HIV transmis-
sion. The HCP must then offer to support the patient during the disclosure.
Where the patient still refuses to disclose and to take other measures to
prevent HIV transmission, the HCP may disclose the HIV status to the
partner(s) after having advised the patient that it is his ethical obligation to do
so and having requested his consent. Interestingly, the guidelines also require
gations to authorisations for notiﬁcations. According to Jurgens, most provinces in
Canada, for instance, have adopted largely informal contact tracing procedures, often
with a focus on voluntary contact tracing. Jurgens op cit note 108 at 368–371.
121 Ibid.
122 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 33.
123 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 34.
124 The SAMA is a professional organisation for public and private sector medical
practitioners.
125 HPCSA op cit note 45; SAMA Ethical and Human Rights Guidelines on HIV and
AIDS Part A — General Principles (2006).
126 HPCSAop cit note 45 at 10.3.
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the counselling to draw attention to the possibility of ‘violence and other
adverse consequences’ of the disclosure.127
The SAMA guidelines on HIV disclosure are slightly stricter than those of
the HPCSA. They stipulate that conﬁdentiality may only be breached if the
partner(s) of the patient can be clearly identiﬁed, if there is a real risk that the
partner(s) will become infected and if there is no other way to protect the
partner.128 A new development since the revision of the SAMA guidelines is
that where a patient strongly believes that the disclosure of his HIV status
entils a risk of harm, the HCP’s primary duty is to protect the life of the
patient; the HIV status should not be disclosed in these circumstances.129
This recommendation makes it clear that the primary duty of the HCP is
towards his patient and not their partner(s).
(2) An analysis of the South African guidelines
The HPCSA and SAMA policies lack sufﬁcient practical guidance for HCPs
who are confronted with the decision of whether or not to notify a sexual
partner, and fail to address important legal questions relating to the limitation
of privacy.
(a) Practical concerns
The main concern regarding the HPCSA’s policy is that it allows HCPs
discretion on whether or not to inform the sexual partner of the source
patient, and instead of guiding this decision, the policy simply states that
HCPs have to accept ‘full responsibility’ for their decision.130 Although the
steps that need to be taken before the disclosure are clearly spelled out
(counselling, offer of support etc.), the guidelines remain silent on important
aspects like what factors should inﬂuence the decision of notifying the
partner. The SAMA policy provides slightly more detail on when a partner
should be notiﬁed.131
Furthermore, both policies lack provisions on how the HCP should
proceed with the disclosure. Questions relating to urgency and how the
notiﬁcation should be undertaken (in person? in writing? via the phone?) are
left unanswered. Although the HPCSAguidelines mention ‘the possibility of
violence and other adverse consequences’ as a result of the disclosure, they
fail to offer any recommendations on how to prevent or deal with such
consequences. The SAMA policy suggests that a partner should not be
notiﬁed where the patient is at risk of harm.
Another problematic aspect is that under the South African as well as the
comparative policies, a notiﬁcation of the partner is envisioned where the
source patient refuses to disclose his HIV status and to practise safer sex and
127 Ibid at 10.3.5.
128 SAMAop cit note 128 at 5.6.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 See above under III.2.b.(1).
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where the partner is at real risk. The question is: How does the HCP know
whether this is the case? Is a ‘promise’ by the source patient sufﬁcient to put
the notiﬁcation off? The SAMAguidelines stipulate that the HCP must have
‘reason to believe that the patient is posing a risk to the sexual partner’ and
that the HCP may be required to show that he was acting ‘on substantial
information and not mere suspicion’. This highlights that a notiﬁcation
requires a thorough risk assessment by the HCP. In practice, however, the
HCP relies on what his patient tells him.132
An important difference between the South African protocols and the
comparative guidelines from Canada is that the former envision disclosing
the HIV status of the source patient instead of warning the partner of the risk of
having been exposed to HIV. Where the HIV status of the source patient is
disclosed, there is an automatic breach of privacy. Preferably, the HCP
should use an anonymous warning relating to HIV exposure. Although an
anonymous notiﬁcation does not necessarily prevent a breach of conﬁdenti-
ality — because the source patient might be the only sexual partner of the
notiﬁed individual — there is at least no automatic breach of privacy.133
(b) Legal concerns
The HPCSA and SAMA guidelines state that to date there is no legal clarity
on whether the notiﬁcation of a sexual partner by an HCP is an ‘acceptable
limitation of the right to privacy’.134 One important issue is thus: Could a
patient sue an HCP for disclosing his HIV status to his partner? Another
crucial question that is overlooked in the guidelines is: Could a partner of an
HIV-positive individual sue the HCP for not warning him or her about the
risk of exposure to HIV? In other words, does the HCP have a duty to warn
the patient’s partner? Although these questions must be clearly distinguished,
they may in certain circumstances be intertwined. If it is established that the
HCP does have a legal duty to inform the patient’s partner, such notiﬁcation
must then be a justiﬁable limitation of privacy. If, on the other hand, the
HCP is under no legal duty to warn the partner, this would not necessarily
imply that a notiﬁcation constitutes an unjustiﬁable limitation of privacy.
(i) Limitation’s of a patient’s privacy
An HIV disclosure by the HCP without the patient’s consent could violate
the constitutional and the common law right to privacy as well as s 14(1)
NHA. But privacy is not absolute; it ﬁnds its limits where it clashes with
other people’s rights. Both the common law and the constitutional law
132 The HCP could only resort to contacting the sexual partner and ask him about
the disclosure but this already implies an HIVdisclosure.
133 Health care professionals also need to keep in mind that the cooperation of the
patient may be necessary to obtain information on the name and/or contact details of
the sexual partner(s).
134 HPCSA op cit note 45 at 10.3. The SAMA guidelines state that ‘in the absence
of case law in this regard, no guarantees can be provided on how the courts and/or
the HPCSAwill view such disclosures’. SAMAop cit note 128 at 5.6.
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require that conﬂicting interests be balanced.135 In the case of HIV
disclosure, the patient’s right to privacy needs to be weighed against his
partner’s right to bodily integrity.136 The potential consequences of a
non-disclosure are far worse for the partner than the effects of a non-
consensual disclosure for the source patient: the partner is at risk of getting
infected with an incurable disease, whereas the patient’s trust in the HCP is
betrayed.137 It is generally agreed that the interest in life outweighs the
interest in privacy. It could therefore be argued that if there is a real risk for
the partner (because the patient emphasises that he will not disclose his HIV
status and will not use condoms) and no other way for the HCP to protect
the partner, the doctor’s breach138 of conﬁdentiality would be justiﬁed. As a
result, an HCP may disclose his patient’s HIV status — but only in certain
circumstances that have to be tested on the merits of each case.
Although an HIV disclosure may constitute a justiﬁable limitation of
privacy, it is suggested that the ambiguity of the guidelines be addressed in
order to provide HCPs with guidance on when and how it is justiﬁable to
undertake a notiﬁcation of the patient’s partner.
(ii) Legal duty to act
The fact that a notiﬁcation by the HCP may be a justiﬁable limitation of
privacy does not tell us whether the HCP is under a legal duty to actually
undertake such notiﬁcation. Under South African common law, the general
rule is that a person does not act wrongfully where he ‘fails to act positively to
135 Under the common law, the balancing of interests is undertaken under the
element of wrongfulness and is based on the boni mores. See Neethling et al op cit 8
§ 3 at 34. In the case of the constitutional law, this test is done as the second stage of
the analysis and is based on the limitation clause, which stipulates that the following
factors need to be taken into account: the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and the
purpose; and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose (s 36(1)(b),
(c), (d), (e) of theConstitution).Also see note 10.
136 Bodily integrity is protected under both the common law and the constitutional
law. See references in note 86.
137 Kenneth Kipnis ‘A Defense of Unqualiﬁed Medical Conﬁdentiality’ (2006) 6
American Journal of Bioethics 7 at 13; Elaine Gibson ‘Medical Conﬁdentiality and Pro-
tection of Third Party Interests’ (2006) 6 American Journal of Bioethics 23 at 23. Despite
this agreement, Kipnis (ibid) advocates for unqualiﬁed medical conﬁdentiality,
whereas respondents to his article reject such a broad concept of conﬁdentiality. See
Gibson (ibid) at 126; John Blaint ‘Should Conﬁdentiality in Medicine Be Absolute?’
(2006) 6 American Journal of Bioethics 19; James G. Hodge ‘The Legal and Ethical
Fiction of ‘‘Pure’’Conﬁdentiality’ (2006) 6 American Journal of Bioethics 21.
138 Gibson (ibid) holds that a disclosure against the patient’s wishes cannot be quali-
ﬁed as a breach of conﬁdentiality, but that this is merely an ‘exception to the duty of
conﬁdentiality’. This understanding should be rejected because it limits the scope and
applicability of conﬁdentiality. It is preferable to deﬁne the concept widely and then
test whether a violation is justiﬁable instead of limiting the scope of the right in the
ﬁrst place.
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prevent harm to another’.139 Courts can only depart from this rule in
exceptional circumstances.140 However, a person may be liable for an
omission if he was under a legal duty to act.141 In Van Eden v Minister of Safety
and Security the court held that a ‘defendant is under a legal duty to act
positively [. . .] if it is reasonable to expect of the defendant to have taken
positive measures to prevent the harm’.142 According to the decision in
Minister of Law and Order v Kadir ‘such a duty arises [. . .] when the
circumstances are such, not only that the omission evokes moral indignation,
but that the legal convictions of the community demand that it be regarded
as wrongful and that the loss should be compensated by the person who
failed to act positively’.143
Van der Walt/Midgley144 compiled a list of factors that courts have taken
into account when determining whether the defendant was under a duty to
act:
the foreseeability and possible extent of harm; the degree of risk that the harm
will materialise; the interests of the defendant and the community; who has
control over the situation; the availability of practical preventative measures,
and the chances of their success; whether the cost in preventing the harm is
reasonably proportional to the harm, and whether or not other practical and
effective remedies are available.
Furthermore, the following aspects might indicate the existence of a legal
duty to act: prior (harmful) conduct; control of a dangerous object; and the
existence of a special relationship or special knowledge.145 Special relation-
ships can be based on contractual relationships, on a person’s occupation or
ofﬁce, or on the impression created by a party that he will protect the other
party.146
An HCPwould thus have a legal duty to inform the patient’s partner if the
boni mores of the community demand that he does. The existence of a
special relationship between the HCP and the patient’s partner could
indicate such a duty. It is generally accepted that a special relationship exists
between the HCP and his patient. The Hippocratic Oath stipulates that
HCPs must act in the best interest of their patients.147 Unless the HCP is the
couple’s family physician and thus has a doctor-patient relationship with
both the patient and his partner, there is no basis for assuming a special
139 Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 3 at 51; 73; J C van der Walt/J R Midgley
Principles of Delict (2005) at 84.
140 Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 3 at 68.
141 Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 3 at 51.
142 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (1) SA389 (SCA).
143 Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 (1) SA303 (A).
144 SeeVan derWalt/Midgley op cit note 139 at 85 for further references.
145 Van derWalt/Midgley op cit note 139 at 85.
146 Neethling et al op cit note 8 § 3 at 62–65.
147 Ludwig Edelstein ‘The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation’
in Owsei Temkin/C Lilian Temkin Ancient medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein
(1967) at 37.
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relationship between the HCP and his patient’s partner.148 Most South
Africans may not even have a family physician in the ﬁrst place. When
getting tested for HIV, most people will do so at public health facilities —
where testing is free of charge — and not at a (private) doctor’s practice. A
special relationship between the HCP and the patient’s partner is therefore
unlikely to exist.
Contrary to this view, the Supreme Court of California found in Tarasoff v
Regents of the University of California that a ‘special relationship to either the
person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [. . .] to the foreseeable
victim of that conduct’ (emphasis added) is sufﬁcient.149 Accordingly, the
Court decided that the special relationship between the psychologist and his
patient was sufﬁcient to create a legal duty for the psychologist to warn the
victim.150 The Court took into account the fact that numerous decisions in
other U.S. jurisdictions had accepted a doctor’s duty to warn members of the
patient’s family of his or her contagious disease.151 In the absence of similar
case law in South Africa and given the strict test for determining a legal duty
to act (on a case-by-case basis), it is unlikely that our courts would concur
with such a broad understanding of a special relationship.
Despite the lack of a special relationship, the HCP could be under a legal
duty to warn the partner if the mores of the community require him to act
because of his special knowledge. The HCP is the only person — apart from
the patient — who knows about his infection with HIV. If the patient refuses
to disclose his status to his partner, the only way to ﬁnd out would be
through the HCP. Furthermore, the harm to the patient’s partner is
148 Such a case was dealt with in the Australian decision Harvey & Ors v PD (2004)
NSWCA97, where it was held that the doctor breached his duty of care to the sexual
partner, who was also his patient. In this case the plaintiff and her ﬁancé attended a
joint consultation for HIV tests and sexually transmitted diseases at the respondents’
medical practice. The ﬁrst respondent, Dr Harvey, who saw the couple, knew that
the plaintiff had a particular concern about her ﬁancé being infected with HIV.
Whereas the plaintiff tested HIV negative, her ﬁancé tested HIV positive, but showed
her a forged or fraudulently obtained HIV negative test result. Subsequently, the
plaintiff acquired HIV from her ﬁancé. The New South Wales Court of Appeal
upheld the trial court’s ﬁnding that the doctors were liable for negligence. The Court
ruled that, during the initial joint consultation, Dr Harvey should have addressed the
fact that in the absence of consent he was legally prohibited from disclosing any
information concerning the HIV status of one to the other, and hence, should have
advised the plaintiff and her future husband to have a mutual disclosure of test results.
Had Dr Harvey conducted the initial consultation more thoroughly, the plaintiff and
her ﬁancé probably would have consented to receiving the test results together and
thereby to sharing the test results with each other.
149 Tarasoff v Regents (1976) 551 P.2d 334 at 343.
150 Ibid.
151 Tarasoff v Regents supra note 149 at 344. Wojcik v Aluminum Co. of America (1959)
18 Misc.2d 740 (183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357–358); Davis v Rodman (1921) 147 Ark. 385
(227 S.W. 612, 13 A.L.R. 1459); Skillings v. Allen (1919) 143 Minn. 323 (173 N.W.
663, 5 A.L.R. 922); Jones v. Stanko (1928) 118 Ohio St. 147 (6 Ohio L.Abs. 77, 160
N.E. 456).
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foreseeable (where the patient informs the HCP that he is not going to
disclose and practise safer sex).152 Last but not least, the extent of harm for the
sexual partner is substantial, given that there is still no cure for HIV/AIDS.
Nevertheless, a legal duty to warn the sexual partner of an HIV-infected
individual must be rejected. The persons who have control over the situation
— another important factor in the balancing — are the patient and his or her
sexual partner. Preventative measures are in their hands. Let us ﬁrst look at
the patient. It appears unreasonable to transfer a patient’s responsibility to the
HCP. First and foremost, it is the patient’s responsibility to protect his partner
from getting infected with a contagious diseases by practising safer sex
and/or disclosing his status.153 Shifting this responsibility onto the HCP and
making him liable for damages would amount to punishing the HCP for the
misconduct of his patients. It would be contrary to the legal convictions of
the community to expect doctors to fulﬁl the duties of their patients and
make them compensate for the losses.
One could also make the argument that in addition to the patient, it is
within the partner’s control to protect himself from HIV/AIDS. Crewe154
noted that although South Africans are aware of HIV and how it is
transmitted, this awareness has so far not resulted in personal behaviour
change. In a country like South Africa, where 15,4% of adult males (15–49
years) and 21,2% of adult females (15–49 years) are HIV positive, nobody can
truly think that he is not at risk for HIV infection.155 HCPs should therefore
not be held liable for people’s failure to protect themselves. The argument
that some people may not be in a position to protect themselves effectively,
for instance because they are in an abusive relationship, does not detract from
this argument. If a person is unable to negotiate safer sex, a notiﬁcation by
the HCP informing him of his risk for HIV will also be unlikely to help
him.156
Another important aspect is that a general legal duty for HCPs would
seriously undermine patient conﬁdentiality, which is not only a fundamental
principle of any doctor-patient relationship, but also particularly important
in the ﬁght against HIV/AIDS. Only when people know that their health
information will be protected will they come forward to get tested,
particularly in the current climate of stigma.157
152 Although the risk of HIV transmission is relatively low from a single sexual
exposure, it is likely that a long-term or permanent partner will eventually become
infected because of the repeated exposure.
153 Whether it is sufﬁcient to practise safer sex without disclosing the HIV status is
another question that goes beyond the scope of this article.
154 M Crewe ‘South Africa: Touched by the vengeance of AIDS’ (2000) 7 South
African Journal of International Affairs 23 at 23; please note that there is a drafting glitch
in this particular sentence of the article.
155 Dorrington et al op cit note 102 at 8.
156 This will be discussed in more detail under III.2.c.(2.).
157 Although some American scholars insist that patients will come forward, get
tested and seek treatment despite the threat of disclosure, it should be taken into
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(c) Partner notification — a gendered perspective
Although partner notiﬁcation is regarded as an important public health tool
in other countries, it remains doubtful whether it should be introduced in
SouthAfrica.158 As noted earlier, the aim of notiﬁcation schemes is to protect
the partner(s) of an HIV-infected person who are unaware of their risk,
particularly women in heterosexual relationships.159 Despite the aim of
ﬁghting gender inequalities, it will be argued here that partner notiﬁcation
programmes might fail just because of them. In addition, a number of
practical challenges undermine the effectiveness of such programmes.
(1) Notification of a male partner
In South Africa, women would be disproportionately affected by a partner
notiﬁcation scheme. Firstly, more females than males are infected with
HIV/AIDS,160 and secondly, women are the ones who are predominantly
tested for HIV through antenatal programmes.161 If an HCP notiﬁes a male
partner and the latter can identify the source patient — which will be the
case in monogamous relationships — the woman may face numerous
negative consequences. Both international and national research shows that
HIV disclosure may put women at risk for loss of economic support,
emotional abuse and blame, abandonment by partner and family, physical
abuse including extreme violence or even death and discrimination.162
account that the American setting is very different from the South African, where
HIV is still highly stigmatised. Furthermore, Kipnis correctly points out that it is
difﬁcult to gather reliable data on whether people are seeking treatment despite the
threat of disclosure or not. Gibson op cit 138 at 23; Kipnis op cit 138 at 14. Also see
the discussion under III.2.c.(4).
158 Sven Trelle/Aijing Shang/Linda Nartey/Jackie A Cassell/Nicola Low
‘Improved effectiveness of partner notiﬁcation for patients with sexually transmitted
infections: systematic review’(2007) 334 British Medical Journal 354 at 354.
159 Timberlake op cit note 103 at 5.
160 The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among females aged 15–49 is 21,2%; among
males in that age group the infection rate is 15,4%. In certain age groups the disparity
between male and female infection rates is a lot higher. For instance, among youths
aged 15–24 years 3,7% of males, but 16,9% of females are infected; among the 25–29
year olds the infection rate for females is 32,5% whereas it is ‘only’ 21,8% for men.
Dorrington et al op cit note 102 at 28; Women have a greater risk of contracting HIV
due to the physiological features of the vagina, the high viral load of semen and the
possibility of unnoticed infections of their genital organs.
161 Shanaaz Mathews ‘Criminalising deliberate HIV transmission’ (2006) 96 (4)
South African Medical Journal 312 at 313.
162 See Suzanne Maman/Amy Medley (WHO) Gender Dimensions of HIV Status
Disclosure to Sexual Partners: Rates, Barriers and Outcomes (2004) at 3; Karen H
Rothenberg/Stephen J Paskey ‘The Risk of Domestic Violence and Women with
HIV Infection: Implications for Partner Notiﬁcation, Public Policy and the Law’
(1995) 85 (11) American Journal of Public Health 1569 at 1571; Suzanne Maman/
Jacquelyn Campbell/Michael D Sweat/Andrea C Gielen ‘The intersections of HIV
and violence: directions for future research and interventions’ (2000) 50 Social Science
and Medicine 459 at 474; Claudia Watts/Charlotte Garcia-Moreno ‘Violence against
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Power imbalances between males and females, economic dependency and
violence against women, particularly domestic violence, are widespread in
South Africa.163 An HIV disclosure through partner notiﬁcation therefore
has the potential to put a woman’s livelihood at risk. If it were to be
introduced in South Africa, it would need to entail comprehensive and
effective screening mechanisms to assess and prevent adverse consequences
of the notiﬁcation.
(2) Notification of a female partner
Informing a woman that her male partner is HIV positive does in itself not
put her in a position to negotiate safer sex. While some will be able to discuss
the necessity of behaviour change with their partner, women living in
unequal or abusive relationships may not be that fortunate. Due to power
imbalances, many women are not in a position to make choices about their
sexuality.164 Accordingly, some women would know that they are at risk
while being unable to protect themselves. The only positive outcome would
then be that they could access voluntary counselling and testing (VCT)
services for HIV and seek support.
(3) Practical challenges
Whether a notiﬁcation can be undertaken will largely depend on the
cooperation of the source patient. The HCP relies on his help for the name
or contact details of the sexual partner as well as for the determination of risk
of the partner. Notiﬁcation schemes (as well as the South African guidelines
for HCPs) only foresee a notiﬁcation if the source patient is unwilling to
disclose his status or fails to practise safer sex. There is however no indication
of how an HCP is supposed to monitor the sexual behaviour of the source
patient. An HCP could only notify the partner where the source client
openly admits that he will not practise safer sex. In addition, the protection of
the identity of the source patient will be impossible in monogamous
relationships and may even be problematic when a casual contact is notiﬁed.
women: its importance for HIV/AIDS’ (2000) 14 AIDS S253 at S259; Timberlake op
cit note 103 at 3; Linda J Koenig/Jan Moore ‘Women, Violence, and HIV:ACritical
Evaluation with Implications for HIV Services’ (2000) 4 Maternal and Child Health
Journal 103 at 104; T A Sixgashe/R Baggaley/C Mathews The Benefits and Harms of
Disclosing HIV Status to Sexual Partners: Data from the Khayelitsha Mother to Child Trans-
mission (MTCT) Pilot Project, Paper presented at the 13th International AIDS Confer-
ence, Durban as quoted inVetten/Bhana op cit note 84 at 11.
163 For an overview of studies examining levels of domestic violence see L Vetten
‘Violence against women: Good practices in combating and eliminating violence
against women’ (2005) Expert Paper for the UN Division of the Advancement of
Women, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp–2005/
documents.html (last accessed 2 February 2008).
164 Vetten references several studies that highlight difﬁculties in relation to negotiat-
ing condom use, seeVetten/Bhana op cit note 84 at 10.
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(4) Implications of partner notification
Another foreseeable challenge is that partner notiﬁcations may drive at-risk
individuals away from VCT services for fear of breaches of conﬁdentiality.
People who fear HIV disclosure and the resulting discrimination may choose
to rather not get tested at all.165 In the current climate, it is likely that creating
notiﬁcation programmes will prevent people from getting tested, thereby
counter-acting the public health goal of getting as many people tested as
possible. Without people getting tested, the chain of transmission cannot be
disrupted and available services such as antiretroviral medication would not
be fully used.
(5) Conclusion
Partner notiﬁcation requires substantial ﬁnancial and human resources —
resources that are scarce in South Africa. Instead of introducing costly
notiﬁcation schemes that only reach a very limited number of people — the
sexual partners of HIV-infected individuals who got tested for HIV — public
health interventions such as universal ‘know-your-status’166 and safer sex
campaigns advertised by mass communications, an increase of VCT sites as
well as increasing the distribution of female condoms167 will probably be
more effective in the prevention of HIV/AIDS. Public health initiatives
should also encourage couples to get tested and have their results disclosed to
them together.168 Rather than disclosing an individual’s status without
consent, patients should be counselled on the beneﬁts of HIV disclosure and
should be offered assistance by the HCP when doing so.
(d) Outlook
While the lack of disclosure and behaviour change among people living with
HIV/AIDS may be concerning, the bigger problem seems to be that many
165 Mathews op cit note 161 at 312.
166 Kevin M De Cock/Dorothy Mbori-Ngacha/Elizabeth Marum ‘Shadow on the
continent: public health and HIV/AIDS inAfrica in the 21st century’ (2002) 360 The
Lancet 67 at 70.
167 Increasing the availability and acceptability of female condoms has so far been
neglected in SouthAfrican public health efforts. Whereas 346 million male condoms
were distributed by 2004, distribution of female condoms only reached 0,2 million in
2003. Dorrington et al op cit note 102.
168 Rhoda K Wanyenze/Cecilia Nawawu/Alice S Namale/Bernard Mayanja/
Rebecca Bunnell/Betty Abang/Gideon Amanyire/Nelson K Sewankambo/Moses
R Kamya ‘Acceptability of routine HIV counselling and testing, and HIV seropreva-
lence in Ugandan hospitals’ (2008) 86 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 302 at
306; De Cock et al op cit note 166 at 70. Couple counselling and testing could
particularly beneﬁt discordant couples, in that HIV infection of one partner might be
considered as a ‘mutual’ problem and how to prevent infecting the HIV negative
partner could be discussed with both partners.
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people do not know their status in the ﬁrst place.169 In one of their
investigations into ‘Aspects of the Law Relating to AIDS’, the SALRC said
that —
since most persons in South Africa are unaware of their HIV status, harmful
HIV-related behaviour cannot be said to be the major cause of the spread of the
epidemic in our society. Harmful behaviour is thus the exception and not the
rule and any steps taken to address such behaviour should take into account that
these will be directed at limited and exceptional behaviour.170
Intentional, harmful exposure to HIV by those who know their status is
thus not the main problem. Twenty years into the epidemic, people are still
rather reluctant to get tested for HIV. Many think they are not at risk; others
simply prefer not to know their status. One method to scale up the rate of
testing is to introduce routine testing for HIV. While HIV testing is usually
required by the patient and is thus ‘client-initiated’, emphasis is now put on
so called ‘provider-initiated’ HIV tests. Provider-initiated means that HCPs
routinely offer such tests to all patients, irrespective of their presenting illness;
the patient then has the option to refuse the test.171 UNAIDS/WHO
recommend that a routine offer of testing be ‘made to all patients seen in
clinical and community based health service settings where HIV is prevalent
and antiretroviral treatment is available [. . .] but who are asymptomatic’.172
Botswana is one of the ﬁrst African countries to have included routine
HIV testing in their health care services.173 Uganda has introduced free
routine HIV testing at two large Ugandan hospitals and found that such
testing was ‘feasible and highly acceptable’.174 Given that routine HIV
testing requires the patient’s informed consent, it does not violate the right to
privacy in any way.175
169 F Viljoen ‘Disclosing in an age of AIDS: Conﬁdentiality and community in
conﬂict?’ in AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit, University of Pretoria (ed)
Righting Stigma: Exploring a rights-based approach to addressing stigma (2005) 64 at 66.
170 SALRC Fifth Interim Report on Aspects of the Law Relating to AIDS — The Need for
a Statutory Offence Aimed at Harmful HIV-Related Behaviour (2001) at xiii.
171 UNAIDS/WHO (2004) ‘UNAIDS/WHO Policy Statement on HIV Testing’;
Wanyenze et al op cit note 168.
172 UNAIDS/WHO ibid.
173 M A Tadesse HIV Testing from an African Human Rights System Perspective: An
Analysis of the Legal and Policy Framework of Botswana, Ethiopia and Uganda at 37;
Alexandra Zavis ‘Botswana adopts new approach to HIV tests’ Mail&Guardian
Online (5 January 2006), available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2006–01–05-
botswana-adopts-new-approach-to-hiv-tests
(last accessed 19 September 2008).
174 Wanyenze et al op cit note 168 at 304.
175 However, other aspects of routine testing may be problematic. As noted above,
UNAIDS/WHO only recommend routine testing where patients have access to
antiretrovirals. It seems unethical to encourage people to get tested and then not have
any medication for the treatment of the condition. Another concern is that patients
may be reluctant to question the suggestion of the doctor or HCP and may thus feel
pressured to consent to the test.
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3 PRIVACY & COMPULSORY HIV TESTING
Another limitation of the right to privacy has been introduced with the
recent enactment of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related
Matters) Amendment Act176 (hereafter: Sexual Offences Act/SOA), which
makes provision for the compulsory HIV testing of alleged sexual and other
offenders.177 The following section will scrutinise whether the compulsory
HIV testing provisions constitute a justiﬁable limitation of the right to
privacy.
(a) Background
South Africa battles with an extremely high incidence of both rape and
HIV/AIDS.178 The concurrence of a high prevalence of sexual violence and
of HIV/AIDS creates a dangerous situation where sexual offence victims,179
in addition to the other traumatising consequences, face the risk of becoming
infected with HIV. Compared to consensual sex, penetrative forms of
coerced sex bear an increased risk of HIV transmission due to the use of force
and sustained injuries.180 Furthermore, in South Africa, women are often
raped more than once and/or by more than one perpetrator, thus increasing
the risk for injuries and facilitating HIV transmission.181 But given that not
every rape leads to HIV transmission, the victim is left with uncertainty until
176 See note 2.
177 This approach has also been taken up in the United States, where many states
enacted legislation allowing victims of sexual offences to apply for a compulsory HIV
test of the rapist; K Smith ‘Mandatory HIV testing for Convicted or Accused Sex
Offenders: Towards a Model Scheme’ (1998) 6 (52) Buffalo Women’s Law Journal 53.
178 In the year 2005/2006 there were 54.926 reported cases of rape; SAPS Crime
Statistics 2006, available at http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2006/_
pdf/provinces/rsa_total.pdf (last accessed 12 April 2007). There is, however, no doubt
that these ﬁgures do not describe the real extent of the problem, because sexual
offences are highly underreported; Shahana Rasool/K Vermaak/R Pharoa/A
Louw/A Stavron Violence Against Women — A National Survey (2002) at 111; South
African Police Service Annual Report of the National Commissioner of the South African
Police Service (2003) at 36.
179 According to the Sexual Offences Act ‘victim’ is deﬁned in gender-neutral
terms. Given that the vast majority of sexual offence victims are female, the term will
be used in the feminine form, but it refers to both male and female victims.
180 Furthermore, anal rape generally bears a higher risk for HIV transmission than
vaginal rape, because of the probability of injuries to the victim.
181 Michelle Roland/Landon Myer/Roy Chuunga/Lorna Martin/Anastasia
Maw/Thomas Coates/ Lynette Denny ‘A Prospective Study of Post-exposure Pro-
phylaxis Following Sexual Assault in SouthAfrica’, Paper presented at the 12th Con-
ference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections, February 2005. A further
problem is that women who are disproportionately often victims of sexual assault are
very vulnerable to HIV transmission because of their physiological features; Vetten/
Bhana op cit note 84 at 5.
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she can ascertain her HIV status through an HIV antibody test.182 This
uncertainty can substantially increase the trauma experienced by the victim.
(b) Overview of the provisions on compulsory HIV testing of alleged offenders in
the Sexual Offences Act
The Sexual Offences Act provides for the victim of a sexual offence or an
interested person on her behalf to make an application for a compulsory HIV
test of the alleged offender183 (s 30 SOA). The application needs to me made
at a police station.184 An investigating ofﬁcer can also apply for an HIV test of
an alleged offender, if the testing appears necessary for investigating an
offence (s 32 (1) SOA). In any case, the application has to be submitted to a
magistrate. Where an application is made by or on behalf of the victim, the
magistrate must make an order for the alleged offender to be tested for HIV
at a designated health facility if he is satisﬁed that there is prima facie evidence
that (1) a sexual offence has been committed against the victim by the alleged
offender, (2) the victim may have been exposed to the bodily ﬂuids of the
alleged offender185 and (3) no more than 90 calendar days have lapsed from
the date on which it is alleged that the offence in question took place (s 31 (3)
SOA).186 Where an application is brought by an investigating ofﬁcer, the
magistrate must make an order for a compulsory HIV test of the alleged
offender if he is satisﬁed that there is prima facie evidence that (1) the alleged
offence has been committed by the alleged offender and (2) HIV testing
182 Certain HIV tests are able to pick up an HIV infection at an earlier stage. The
latest antibody test (3rd generation ELISA plus p24) picks up antibodies approxi-
mately 14 days after initial infection (Personal Communication with Dr. Steve
Andrews (MBChB (UCT); FCFP (SA); MPhil (Bioethics), Private Practitioner in
HIV/AIDS Clinic, Cape Town). It is, however, unclear whether these tests are used
nationally at public health clinics. Furthermore, polymerase chain reaction tests
(PCR), which test for the virus itself, are able to pick up an infection from about ten
days after seroconversion. These tests are, compared to antibody tests, very expensive,
require special expertise for analysis and are not commonly used for HIV testing at
public health facilities. For more information on HIV diagnostics, see Adrian J Puren
‘HIV diagnostics’ in S. S. Abdool Karim/Q.Abdool Karim (eds) HIV/AIDS in South
Africa (2005) at 89.
183 According to the Sexual Offences Act, both males and females may be the
(alleged) offender of a sexual offence. Although the vast majority of offenders are
male, and the term will be used in the masculine form, it refers to both male and
female offenders.
184 It can be made as soon as a charge has been laid, but at the latest 90 days after the
offence has allegedly happened (s 30(1), (3) SOA).
185 The term ‘bodily ﬂuids’ refers to semen, vaginal ﬂuids and blood (s 27 SOA).
Mostly, an exposure to bodily ﬂuids that carries a risk for transmission will occur
during penetrative forms of a sexual offence, which under the new legislation consti-
tute rape (ss 3, 1 SOA).
186 A further prerequisite is that the alleged offender has not yet been tested for HIV
on application by a police ofﬁcial (s 31(3)(ii) SOA). Interestingly, evidence by or on
behalf of the offender may only be considered by the magistrate if to do so will not
give rise to any substantial delay (s 31(2) SOA).
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would appear to be necessary for purposes of investigating or prosecuting the
offence (s 32(3) SOA).
Once an order is made, the alleged offender has to undergo HIV testing at
a designated health facility.187 The result of the test will be disclosed to the
applicant (victim/person acting on her behalf; or investigating ofﬁcer), to the
alleged offender and where applicable to the prosecutor.188
(c) Implications of compulsory HIV testing
The compulsory HIV testing provisions are problematic for a number of
reasons. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to comprehen-
sively discuss concerns about their feasibility and utility as well as their
implications for human rights other than privacy.189
As set out earlier, testing a person’s blood for HIV and disclosing the test
result without his consent constitutes an infringement of the common law
and the constitutional right to privacy.190 It needs to be tested whether this
infringement is justiﬁable under the common law and under the constitu-
tional law, which require that conﬂicting interests be balanced.191
(1) Application by an investigating officer
Where an investigating ofﬁcer applies for the test, the alleged offender’s
interest in privacy could be outweighed by the state’s interest in the effective
policing and prosecuting of crimes. Police investigations, including the
collection of evidence, are the basis for the successful prosecution of crimes
and thus constitute an essential prerequisite for the functioning of the
187 Non-compliance with the order constitutes an offence (s 38(2) SOA).
188 The prosecutor and any other person who needs to know the test results will be
informed of the results if they are to be used in ensuing civil or criminal proceedings
(s 37(1) SOA).
189 The compulsory HIV testing process may violate the accused’s right to a fair trial
(s 35 Constitution), the right to freedom and security of the person (s 12 Constitu-
tion) and the right to procedural fairness (s 33 Constitution). Some of these issues
were raised by respondents to the draft Compulsory HIVTesting Bill, which was later
included in the SOA. See SALRC Fourth Interim Report on Aspects of the Law relating to
AIDS — Compulsory HIV Testing of Persons Arrested in Sexual Offence Cases (2000) at
193–200.Also see Stefanie Roehrs ‘Half-Hearted HIV-Related Services For Victims’
§ 8 at 175–197 in L Artz/D Smythe (eds) Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in
South Africa (in press). For a more detailed discussion, particularly around practical
concerns, also see Stefanie Roehrs ‘Implementing the Unfeasible — Compulsory
HIVTesting forAlleged Sexual Offenders’ (2007) 22 Crime Quarterly 27 at 30–33.
190 The (less convincing) argument that the sexual offender may have forfeited his
rights by committing the sexual offence is not applicable here because the person to
be tested is an accused, not a convicted criminal.
191 For details about the balancing see note 135. According to s 36 of the Constitu-
tion, laws that limit a human right must observe two criteria: (1) a human right may
only be limited by a law of general application; (2) this law must be reasonable and
justiﬁable in an open and democratic society. The Sexual OffencesAct certainly fulﬁls
the ﬁrst requirement. To establish whether the legislation fulﬁls the second require-
ment the factors listed in note 135 have to be taken into account.
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criminal justice system. The ascertainment of bodily ﬂuids may form an
essential part of the investigation of a speciﬁc crime and may be necessary for
its prosecution (eg blood tests in drunken driving cases). The police need to
have the tools at hand to investigate serious crimes effectively in order to
protect society from harm. It could therefore be argued that creating a
mechanism for the police to obtain a blood sample of an alleged offender and
have it tested for HIV is a reasonable limitation of privacy under the
common law, because under the boni mores the interest in effective crime
prevention and prosecution overrides the alleged offender’s right to privacy.
The same could be submitted in relation to the constitutional test: limiting
the rights of the accused is justiﬁable because the limitation serves the
important purpose of an effective criminal justice system.
However, this line of argument can easily be rebutted. The compulsory
HIV testing provisions are unnecessary because the law already provides for
blood tests, including HIV tests, for investigative and evidentiary purposes.
Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act192 (CPA) states that any police
ofﬁcial may take such steps as he or she deems necessary in order to ascertain
whether the body of an accused has any ‘characteristic’ or ‘distinguishing
feature’, or shows any ‘condition’. The CPA allows the police to make an
order for the taking of a blood sample to perform tests for identiﬁcation
purposes or to obtain evidence (s 37(1)(c), (2)(a) of the CPA). Where a police
ofﬁcial is not allowed to order a blood test, a court before which criminal
proceedings are pending may make such order if necessary (s 37(3) of the
CPA). The fact that the CPA provisions were not drafted with HIV/AIDS
testing in mind is irrelevant. What is important is that the provisions are
phrased broadly enough to cover HIV tests.
The courts have found that s 37 of the CPA does not interfere with an
alleged offender’s constitutional rights.193 Given that the new statutes
replicate the provisions of the CPA, it could be contended that the new
provisions are justiﬁable because they serve the same purpose as the CPA
provisions. However, since the purpose is already fulﬁlled by the CPA, the
provisions in the Sexual Offences Act are not necessary to achieve the
purpose. According to Currie/De Waal194 reasonableness requires the
limitation of a right to serve at least some purpose. How can the compulsory
HIV testing provisions serve a purpose when this purpose is, in fact, already
192 Criminal ProcedureAct 51 of 1977.
193 In S v Huma and Another the court declared that the taking of ﬁnger prints does
not constitute a violation of a person’s constitutional right to dignity, but even if it did,
such violation would be justiﬁable; S v Huma and Another 1996 (1) SA 232 (W) 237
E–F. In S v Orrie and Another Bozelak J conceded that the involuntary taking of a
blood sample for DNAproﬁling constituted both an invasion of the alleged offender’s
right to privacy and bodily security and integrity. However, to the extent that such
testing is undertaken for use in criminal proceedings, the limitation of these rights is
permitted to ensure that justice is done; S v Orrie and Another 2004 (3) SA584 (C) 591
E–G.
194 Currie/DeWaal op cit note 7 § 14 at 179.
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fulﬁlled? This view may, on the other hand, appear somewhat formalistic
because the core of both laws is the same: strengthening the criminal justice
system. One may therefore contest that the same aim cannot be considered
reasonable concerning the existing CPA but unreasonable concerning the
new legislation. In the end, there is no need to resolve this argument.
Whether the provisions are regarded as unreasonable or simply as redundant,
they are deﬁnitely superfluous to enabling proper policing and prosecutions.
(2) Application by a victim
With regard to an application by the victim, the limitation of the alleged
offender’s privacy would be justiﬁed if the victim’s interests override those of
the accused.195According to the legislation, the purpose of testing the alleged
offender for HIV is to reduce the victim’s trauma and to empower the victim
‘to make informed medical, lifestyle and other personal decisions’.196
Furthermore, the Sexual Offences Act suggests that the victim could use the
test result as evidence in any ensuing civil proceedings as a result of the sexual
offence’.197 It will be shown that testing the alleged offender for HIV does
not help the victim to make any of these decisions and will not be useful in
ensuing civil proceedings.
(a) Trauma, medical and lifestyle decisions
Helping the victim to make ‘medical decisions’ refers mainly to the decision
of whether or not to use post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP). PEP is a 28-day
regimen of antiretroviral drugs, which may prevent the transmission of HIV.
Other medical decisions may include whether to terminate an existing
pregnancy or stop breastfeeding because of the risk of HIV infection for
mother and child.
The decision whether or not to start PEP needs to be made immediately
after the sexual offence and cannot wait for the outcome of the test.
Although PEP is given to victims up to 72 hours after the sexual offence, the
medication should be started as soon as possible after the exposure, preferably
within a couple of hours.198 It is highly unlikely — if not impossible — that
the application will be made, a court order be issued, the alleged offender be
notiﬁed and tested, and the victim be informed of the result within 72 hours,
let alone a couple of hours. Testing the accused for HIV can therefore not
facilitate the victim’s decision on whether to start PEP.
195 The limitation of the alleged offender’s privacy must be reasonable according to
the boni mores principle and must be justiﬁable under the limitation clause (s 36
Constitution).
196 Section 34(a)(i) of the Sexual OffencesAct.
197 Ibid.
198 United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ‘Antiretroviral Post-
Exposure Prophylaxis After Sexual, Injection-Drug Use, or Other Nonoccupational
Exposure to HIV in the United States’ (2005) 54 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
RR2:8; C Fong ‘Post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV infection after sexual assault:
When is it indicated?’ (2001) 18 Emergency Medicine Journal 242 at 244.
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However, the test result could possibly still be useful at a later stage. It
could enable the victim to make medical decisions about stopping PEP or
terminating an existing pregnancy, or ‘lifestyle decisions’ about the necessity
of practising safer sex. Unfortunately, the test result cannot be used for
making any of these decisions. As has been pointed out by experts,199 the test
result is unreliable due to the ‘window period’. The window period refers to
the ﬁrst three to six, sometimes up to 12, weeks after the initial infection
during which HIV antibody tests cannot detect antibodies to the virus in the
blood.200 However, the risk of transmission is particularly high at this time
because of a high viral load.201As a result, an alleged sexual offender who is in
the window period will test HIV negative, despite being HIV positive and
highly infectious. The test result may thus be unreliable. Therefore, the
victim cannot rely on the test result for making medical and lifestyle
decisions. The same uncertainty exists where an alleged offender tests HIV
positive. An HIV-positive test result does not imply that the virus was
transmitted during the sexual offence. The risk of transmission depends on a
number of factors such as sustained injuries and the presence of blood and
other sexually transmitted infections. To be on the safe side, the victim
should continue to use PEP and practise safer sex despite any outcome of the
test.
The uncertainty of the test result and the fact that the accused’s status does
not reﬂect the victim’s status also imply that pregnancy-related decisions
cannot be based on the result and that the test is unable to reduce the victim’s
trauma. Due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the victim is faced with a
number of incredibly difﬁcult and traumatic decisions. Compulsory HIV
testing however will not help the victim deal with the aftermath of the
offence.
199 This was already pointed out during the drafting of the provisions. Respondents
with this view included the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions Venda High
Court, the Society ofAdvocates of Natal, Mr Ronald Louw, PretoriaAIDS Training,
Counselling and Information Centre (ATICC), Northern Province ATICC, the
South African Prisoner’s Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR), representa-
tives of the SALRC’s Sexual Offences Project Committee, and the AIDS Legal Net-
work, see SALRC op cit note 189 at 197. Also see K C Goyer ‘Compulsory HIV
testing for alleged sexual offenders: victim empowerment or violation of rights’
(2001) 11 (6) AIDS Analysis Africa 8; Stefanie Roehrs ‘Compulsory HIV tests for
sexual offenders’ (2003) 8 News & Views for Magistrates 1; Stefanie Roehrs ‘Positive or
Negative? Compulsory HIV testing for alleged sexual offenders’ (2007) 20 Crime
Quarterly 34 at 36.
200 Antibody tests are the tests that are currently predominantly used in the South
African public health system. They do not test for the virus, but for an immunological
response to HIV. So called polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR) can identify HIV
during the window period. But even these tests can only detect the virus from about
seven to ten days after initial infection. As these tests are very expensive and highly
sensitive and require laboratory facilities for analysis, the author assumes that these
tests will not be used for the compulsory HIV tests of alleged sexual offenders. See
note 182 for references.
201 Goyer op cit note 199 at 8.
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(b) Using the test result in civil proceedings
Another purpose of compulsory HIV testing is to provide the victim with
evidence for ensuing civil proceedings. The legislation thereby suggests that
the test result will help the victim claim damages for suffering and/or
HIV/AIDS transmission resulting from the sexual offence. But the test result
is unsuitable for this purpose.
Firstly, the test result neither proves that the sexual offence took place, nor
that the alleged offender was infected with HIV at the time of the sexual
offence. Instead, the test result may show, though not reliably, whether the
alleged offender was infected with HIV at the time of the test. Proving that the
alleged offender was HIV positive at the time of the offence will remain very
difﬁcult.
Secondly, an HIV-positive test result does not prove that the victim
contracted HIV as a result of the sexual offence, even if this may have been
the case. Biological evidence that one person was infected with the
HIV-strain of another requires a special DNA test that is very expensive and
can only be analysed by specialised pathologists at certain laboratories.202 The
victim would therefore still need to prove that she was HIV negative before
the sexual offence and that the offence was likely to have been her only
exposure to HIV. The HIV test itself would thus be of little relevance and
assistance.
(c) Justiﬁability
In summary, it is submitted that compulsory HIV testing constitutes an
unjustiﬁable limitation of privacy. The victim’s interests do not outweigh the
alleged offender’s interest in privacy because the victim does not beneﬁt
from having the alleged offender tested. The relevant provisions in the
Sexual Offences Act therefore violate the common law and the constitu-
tional right to privacy.
(d) Practical concerns
Although not directly relevant to the foregoing discussion, it appears
necessary to brieﬂy reﬂect on a few practical concerns relating to compulsory
HIV testing.203 Though envisioned as a ‘victims’ service’, compulsory HIV
testing may backﬁre and instead put victims at risk. The greatest danger is
that the accused is tested for HIV during the window period and the victim
relies on the HIV-negative test result for medical and lifestyle decisions. If for
instance the victim decides to stop taking PEP and practising safer sex, she
risks HIV infection for herself and her partner. Proper education around the
202 Personal communication with Prof. Lorna J Martin (MB BCh (Wits), Dip For
Med (SA) M Med Path (Forens), FC for Path (CMSA), Head of Division of Forensic
Medicine andToxicology, University of CapeTown.
203 As noted above, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the feasibility of
the provisions. See Roehrs op cit note 189.
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implications of compulsory HIV testing is therefore vital.204 Other concerns
relate to the criminalisation of victims and implementation challenges.205
4 CONCLUSION
With HIV/AIDS being the most stigmatised disease in modern history, the
protection of privacy is crucial for the fulﬁlment of other human rights such
as bodily and psychological integrity and equality. However, privacy is not an
absolute right and an HIV-infected individual’s privacy needs to be balanced
with their sexual partner’s right to bodily integrity. Current policies for HCP
are unclear about which circumstances require an HCP to inform the sexual
partner of his patient of his exposure to HIV, and whether such disclosure
would be a justiﬁable limitation of the patient’s privacy. The argument is
made that such disclosure may constitute a justiﬁable limitation of privacy,
but that there is no general legal duty for HCPs to warn their patients’
partners. Given that partner notiﬁcation programmes are difﬁcult to
implement and only reach a limited target group, they should not be
introduced in South Africa. Instead of counteracting gender imbalances,
these programmes have the potential to expose vulnerable women to
(further) abuse, abandonment and violence. Partner notiﬁcation schemes
might also deter people from using voluntary counselling and testing
services, thereby driving the epidemic further underground.
Finally, the analysis of the new statute on compulsory HIV testing of
alleged offenders indicates that these provisions constitute an unjustiﬁable
violation of the right to privacy. With regard to investigating ofﬁcers, the
provisions are redundant because blood tests for investigative purposes are
already covered under previous statutory legislation. Balancing victims’ and
accuseds’ rights shows that victims will not beneﬁt from having the alleged
offender tested for HIV. In the absence of such beneﬁt, the limitation of the
alleged offender’s privacy appears unjustiﬁable.
204 The Sexual Offences Act and the policy framework for its implementation,
however, lack provisions around counselling of the victim.According to the policies,
the victim will be handed a notice explaining ‘how to deal with the test results’. See
s 33(1)(e)(i) of the Sexual Offences Act and the Department of Justice and Constitu-
tional Development Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Regula-
tions, Government Gazette No. 31076, Regulation No. 5 (4) (b).
205 Conviction rates in rape cases are very low and therefore the majority of alleged
offenders walk free after the criminal trial. After having had to undergo an HIV test
the offender might try to get back at the victim by ﬁling a civil claim for damages or
laying a charge and have the victim prosecuted for making a ‘malicious’ application —
an option provided for under the legislation (s 38(1)(a) SOA). Fortunately, the pros-
ecution for a malicious application requires written authorisation by the relevant
Director of Public Prosecutions (s 38(1)(c) SOA). See Human Rights Watch for
conviction rates in sexual offences, Human Rights Watch, available at http://
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/safric7010.htm (last accessed 2 February 2008).
SeeRoehrs op cit note 189 for an in-depth discussion of practical challenges.
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